Revolutionary Moderation

The promised correspondence



Back on May 10, I blogged this smarmy little entry about this article in the Washington Post. I am reluctant to boil the article down here, but just a reminder: it's about the foreign policy objective of reducing ambiguity. If you didn't read the article then, now would be a good time, to follow the rest of this post.



I was, I'll admit, a little surprised to receive e-mail from the author of the Washington Post article, Michael Schrage, last week. The understanding that anyone can actually read what I'm writing here was a little disconcerting. (I've gotta start spellchecking.)



Here is the correspondence, edited slightly for readability, but not at all for content:

(Michael S)...well, thanks for the mention, but even left-leaning canadians should be able to offer an even-handed interpretation of an argument before attempting to skewer it...then again, that's less fun -cheers, mds







(Don)I'm happy to admit it was not the most thoughtful post ever written, so your point there is well taken (if you'd like, I'll be happy to blog that same admission). I may not have posted it had your department been labelled Strategic, as opposed to Security Studies, because that was certainly the point I flashed on that made me curious enough to read the piece.



I think your analysis of Hussein�s rationale for wanting to preserve ambiguity was pretty cogent. It makes much less sense to me from the American realpolitik point of view. And given that the Administration was producing lies and fabrications leading up to the war (Quite a sentence, your "...Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's dramatic yet desperate presentation before the U.N. Security Council was harshly attacked by critics who maintained that, yes, America's WMD evidence was inconclusively ambiguous." It seems to me you're dissembling a bit, here... that satellite photo didn't fake itself), I would think that people with CIA reports to read and actual satellite images to see may have had a much less ambiguous view of Iraq's WMD potential than Saddam might have wished.



Likewise, it also appeared that the American Administration was constantly closing doors on any diplomatic "outs" Iraq might have had to avoid the war. What you suggested, that Iraq could let it quietly slip that they had no weapons, was quietly slipped by Powell's star witness, Hussien Kamel years ago. There was no evidence that WMD were being produced since.



During the leadup, those who disagreed with my anti-war stance called me foolish (and far worse) for not believing that there was much of anything left in the Iraqi WMD arsenal, along with not believing the alleged links with al Quada. Now, post-war (and what looks on-and-off to me like pre-the next military adventure), I may be too quick and too defensive about other claims and rationales as to why the war was necessary. If I was too dismissive of your op-ed piece, for that I apologise.



But one of the basic themes running through my weblog has been that America the Republic is to be admired, while America the Empire is to be feared. An America that is ready to go to war in order to protect their interests against ambiguous threats, possible threats, as opposed to credible threats, is closer to Empire than Republic. And the effect is multiplied when the United Stated seems disinterested in diplomatic work with their allies to bring them onside. If your essay was meant merely to point out the reality of the realpolitik calculations made by Iraqi and American leadership, then your lack of discussion about those strained diplomatic relations and the negative impact on the security of American interests worldwide is a huge omission. It hints that your essay was interested in advocacy of the anti-ambiguity strategy, not merely a reporting of it. -Don







(Schrage)thank you for your thoughtful response; I accept several of your comments as eminently fair...



that said, I think you�re being a tad harsh when you say the US precluded saddam�s more diplomatic �outs� in that kamal had said wmd had been � or was being � destroyed...i don�t think two or three defectors are enough in this instance � ESPECIALLY after a 9-11...



I think we have to accept the reality that hussein looked at 9-11, bush�s treatment of arafat after the karine-a, and the afghanistan conflict and STILL believed he could get away with rebuffing the US ... The world had changed as far as the US Administration was concerned...Ironically, I think he felt he �won� when the UN was sent in to inspect because, frankly, he and his people had done a pretty good job dealing with the UN on iraq�s terms...in other words, saddam hussein had a less-good hand that he played very, very badly... I honestly believe that if he ! had been even 20 percent more open and aggressive BEFORE 1441, he and his loathsome sons would still be torturing iraqis � sheltered beneath the protective wings of an invertebrate EU and a terrified saudi arabia, etc. - best, mds

As much as I appreciate the tip of the hat in the last of those e-mails, there are a couple of things that are notable beyond that:



- Resolution 1441 has been identified here as the cut point, the point beyond which we were on the monorail to Shocktown and Aweville. I think that's correct, but it certainly makes a mockery of the UN process, recognizing out loud that to the American government, the UN is a hoop to jump through, not a tool to peaceful disarmament.



- The main argument I would have to the final e-mail here is that I don't think September 11 was the real spark of a change in foreign policy direction for the American government. An excuse, yes (and no, I don't think there was a conspiracy within that government to promote or even allow the attacks, but that's another post), but I think you would see moves in this direction regardless. September 11 created fertile ground for the American public to embrace an aggressive policy of international control, but I think there's plenty of evidence that yer Paul Wolfowitzes and yer Dick Cheneys were looking that direction long before.